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THE MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES.* By The Amencan Law 
Institute. Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1980. Pp. 439. 
$105.00. 
The Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute is one of the 
major works in criminal law. It has had a remarkable impact since its 
completion in 1962. More tha~ half of the states have expressly relied 
on the Code, 1 numerous other states have been influenced by it in their 
recent codifications, and innumerable court decisions have discussed the 
provisions of the Code.2 One of the difficulties with the Code stemmed 
from the fact that the original Commentaries to it were completed in 
1962.3 In the two decades since the Code came out there have been 
tremendous changes in the substantive criminal law which were not re-
flected in the earlier commentaries to the Code. Many states have sub-
stantially limited the application of the felony-murder rule.4 With 
respect to the death penalty, the United States Supreme Court has been 
extremely active, holding that the "sentence of death is grossly dispro-
portionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape and is there-
fore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual 
punishment,''5 and further holding that death penalty statutes are only 
constitutional if they "guide, regularize, and make rationally reviewable 
the process for imposing a sentence of death."6 In other areas as well, 
the changes have been dramatic. Some states have begun to consider 
the possibility, at least, of convicting a husband for the rape of his wife, 7 
* © 1982 by Paul Marcus. The excellent research assistance of Helen Gunn, University 
of Illinois College of Law, Class of 1983 is gratefully acknowledged. 
1 According to the revised commentaries, 34 "state codifications or revisions have now 
drawn upon the Model." MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES XI (Official Draft and 
Revised Comments 1980) [hereinafter cited as COMMENTARIES]. 
2 The Code was also quite influential in the drafting of the proposed revised Federal 
Criminal Code, currently pending in Congress as H.R. 4711 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). 
3 Thirteen tentative drafts with accompanying comments were considered between 1953 
and 1962. 
4 See i'n.fta text accompanying notes 73-97. 
5 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). 
6 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976). 
7 &e, e.g., OR. REv. STAT.§ 163.375 (1979) which provides: "(1) A person who has sex-
811 
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and in most jurisdictions the problem of criminal actions revolving 
around child custody disputes has intensified.8 
Professor Peter Low as Reporter and Professor John Jeffries as As-
sociate Reporter, both from the University of Virginia School of Law, 
have provided a great service by revising and updating these commenta-
ries. Their work began in 1976 and took almost five years; this tremen-
dous effort is reflected in a fine product spanning three volumes. 
In this article I will analyze the Code, along with the Commenta-
ries, as found in the first of these volumes, "Offenses Involving Danger to 
the Person."9 Four separate topics are dealt with in this volume: Crimi-
nal Homicide (Article 210); Assault, Reckless Endangering, Threats (Ar-
ticle 211); Kidnapping and Related Offenses, Coercion (Article 212); 
and Sexual Offenses (Article 213). I will focus attention on the first of 
these topics. 
This review is restricted to an evaluation of the homicide materials 
solely because of time and space constraints. Such a restriction is unfor-
tunate, as important issues continue to arise in the other three areas and 
are well analyzed by the commentators. In the death penalty area 
much discussion is given to the questions of the role of the jury in impos-
ing the penalty, the type of homicide which should be the subject of the 
penalty, and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. 10 The 
materials dealing with rape focus attention on the proof problems, the 
question of the desirability of gender neutral language in a rape stat-
ute, 11 and grading of statutes which impose certain age limitations for 
ual intercourse with a female commits the crime of rape in the first degree if: (a) The female 
is subjected to forcible compulsion by the male." 
8 Section 212.4 of the Code provides, in part, that an offense is committed if the defend-
ant "knowlingly or recklessly takes or entices any child under the age of 18 from the custody 
of its parent, guardian or other lawful custodian when he has no privilege to do so." Se-e 
discussion in COMMENTARIES, supra note I, at 249-52, 257-61. 
9 The other two volumes deal with offenses against property (arson, burglary, robbery, 
theft, forgery), offenses against the family (bigamy, incest) and offenses against public admin-
istration (bribery, perjury, obstructing governmental operations, abuse of office) or against 
public order and decency (riot, disorderly conduct, obscenity). 
10 See discussion in COMMENTARIES, supra note I, at 110-71. 
II The commentators discuss this point: 
There are a number of features of the Michigan statute that should be noted in 
contrast to the Model Code. Perhaps the most striking is the avoidance of gender speci-
ficity in the Michigan statute and the grading consequences of such an approach. Rape 
by a female upon a male or another female and rape by a male upon another male are 
treated in Michigan at the same level of seriousness as rape by a male upon a female. 
There is symbolic importance in the introduction of such an equivalence into the law. 
There are also cases where the trauma of rape may be just as great as in the male imposi-
tion upon a female to which the most serious form of the offense has been traditionally 
confined. But the fact remains, as reflected in the Model Penal Code, that rape is per-
ceived as such a serious crime because of the frequency of attacks by males upon females 
and because of the peculiar harms generally associated with that form of the offense. 
Undoubtedly the serious sanctions of the Michigan statute are designed with that case in 
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sexual relations with an underage victim. 12 Finally, in the assault area 
the Code "undertakes a substantial restructing of prior law. It elimi-
nates the common law categories and many of the antecedent statutory 
variations in favor of a single integrated provision."13 
It is in the homicide area, however, that the Model Penal Code has 
had perhaps the greatest impact. In bringing uniformity to an inconsis-
tent body oflaw, in taking positions on controversial substantive areas, 14 
and in developing a grading system which brings important policy con-
siderations into the forefront of the punishment decisions, the Code's 
contribution is significant. It is to this contribution that we now turn. 
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 
The draftsmen of the Code chose to deal with a host of subjects 
under the rubric of "criminal homicide." Analysis of responsibility for 
aiding the suicide attempts of another, a view of the capital punishment 
quandry, and a discussion of negligent homicide are but a few of the 
areas discussed. In this portion of the article, I will explore in some 
detail three subjects of particular importance: the definitions of crimi-
nal homicide, murder, .and manslaughter. 
The Model Penal Code, section 210.1, provides that: 
"(1) A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he purposely, 
knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death of another human 
being. 
(2) Criminal homicide is murder, manslaughter or negligent 
homicide." 
There are three striking features of the homicide definition. 15 The 
first is not apparent from a reading of§ 210.1, but rather is one empha-
sized by the commentators. The Code simply requires that the actor 
cause the death of the victim. 16 It thus "renders unnecessary the ancient 
requirement that death of another take place within a year and a day of 
mind and will in fact be imposed in such cases in all but a very few instances. Neverthe-
less, as an abstract proposition, the question of whether a rape statute should be drafted 
in sex neutral terms seems a close one . . . . (I]t may well be that the Michigan approach 
is the more desirable. 
/d. at 294. 
12 The rape materials are discussed id. at 274-356. 
13 ld. at 183. 
14 Controversial substantive areas of the law which the Model Penal Code has taken a 
position on are the grading of murder into degrees and the felony murder rule. 
15 As might be expected, however, there are other features that are important as well, such 
as the limitation of homicide to actions which the defendant causes purposely, knowingly, 
recklessly, or negligently; and the division of criminal homicide into but three categories of 
murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide. 
16 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 9. 
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the actor's conduct," 17 the so-called year-and-a-day rule. 
By the Eighteenth Century, and indeed much earlier, we find a general 
assumption that a homicide could be prosecuted as such only if the death 
occurred within a year and a day of the act; this was distinct from any 
question of the period of limitations for commencing a prosecution. . . . 
The standard, if perhaps unhistorical, explanatjon of the rule, often re-
peated in the books, is that in the condition of medical science until recent 
times, it would have been hard to establish convincingly a line of causation 
between an act and a relatively distant death, and it was thus plausible to 
make the presumption ('conclusive' as well as arbitrary) that a death more 
than a year removed from the assault or similar antecedent arose from a 
natural rather than the criminal cause. . . . Occasionally it has been 
surmised that the rule was linked in some way to the early function of the 
jury as reporters of the happenings of the vicinage who required no aid 
from witnesses-but the jury would not have had knowledge sufficient to 
trace cause to effect over a sizeable interval of time. . . . Again we find a 
suggestion that the rule was intended simply to soften the old brutal law 
regarding homicides. 18 
The rule has been subject to considerable criticism and has been re-
jected by many legislators and courts. 19 As one New Jersey court put it: 
The court recognize(s] advances in medical technology to which the law 
must respond. 
The acceptance or rejection of available medical technology and ma-
chines which can postpone the actual time of death, due whenever it oc-
curs, as a result of wounds inflicted upon a victim, should not insulate the 
assailant from trial and punishment for the crime. 
The common law "year and a day rule" does not conform to present-
day medical realities, principles of equity or public policy. We reject it as 
an anachronism and declare that it is no longer part of the common law of 
this State.20 
The second striking feature of the homicide definition is that the 
Code does not define the crucial term "death." This omission is, in a 
sense, justifiable because most states do not define the term in their pe-
nal codes and "because this delicate interplay between the criminal law 
and the advances of medial science is yet too uncertain to reduce to 
statutory formulation."21 Such an approach by the draftsmen is too 
facile. In many states today efforts are being made to codify the defini-
tion of the term; in still others, judges have had to wrestle with different 
and conflicting definitions. 
The commentators correctly note that in the vast majority of homi-
17 Id. 
18 Commonwealth v. Lewis, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1973, 409 N.E.2d 771, 772-73 (1980), 
cert. dmi'ed, 450 U.S. 929 (1981). 
19 But see, e.g., IDAHO CODE§ 18-4008 (1979); Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164, 178, 
166 A.2d 501, 512 (1960) (Musmanno, J., dissenting). 
20 State v. Young, 148 N.J. Super. 405, 412-13, 372 A.2d 1117, 1121 (1977). 
21 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 11. 
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cide cases the meaning of death is not at issue.22 In these cases, no mat-
ter what the definition, the victim is clearly dead. In other cases, where 
the victim's condition is maintained through sophisticated medical tech-
nology, the question is a troublesome one.23 The issue was well stated 
by an English law professor, Ian Kennedy: 
What is this discussion of death all about? Until comparatively recently, 
there was no argument about when someone was dead. Death was defined 
as "the absence of vital functions", breathing and heart beat. Then along 
came machines which could maintain a patient's breathing. Polio victims 
were among the beneficiaries of this development, since the so-called iron 
lung could now breathe for them. Then there appeared machines which 
could take over the functions of the heart and lungs for a while. Open 
heart surgery, in which the heart may be stopped for a period of time, 
became possible. 
But inevitably a problem arose. If we regard someone as dead when 
his vital functions are absent, what do we do with someone whose vital 
functions are maintained by a machine and accompanying technology? 
The polio victim isn't dead, nor is the patient undergoing heart surgery. 
But the victim of a car accident whose head has been crushed is breathing 
by means of a respirator though the respirator may be ventilating a corpse. 
Clearly the machinery may mimic life when the patient is dead.24 
In this country the issue has begun to surface with some regularity, 
as in the case of State v. Fierro. 25 The defendant there purposefully shot 
Victor Corella in the head. Corella was taken to the hospital where 
emergency surgery was performed. He was maintained on support sys-
tems for three days; at that point the systems were terminated and he 
was pronounced dead. The court conceded that under the common law 
test (which had been used up to that point in Arizona) he would not 
have been legally dead, for "the body of the victim was breathing, 
though not spontaneously, and blood was pulsating through his body 
before the life support mechanisms were withdrawn."26 Under the more 
modern view of death, Corella had died three days before the systems 
were withdrawn, because at that time his brain was no longer able to 
function. The Uniform Brain Death Act27 stated that "for legal and 
medical purposes an individual who has sustained irreversible cessation 
22 Id. at 10. 
23 The best known case raising the problem was the Karen Quinlan case, In re Quinlan, 70 
N.J. 10, 57, 355 A.2d 647, 669, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976), where the court concluded 
that there was no "reasonable possibility of return to cognitive and sapient life, as distin-
guished from the forced continuance of that biological vegetative existence to which Karen 
seems to be doomed." 
24 Kennedy, Show Biz and the .Doctors-Why Panorama Was Wrong, The Sunday Times 
(London), Nov. 30, 1980, § 1, at 16, col. 3. 
25 124 Ariz. 182, 603 P.2d 74 (1979). 
26 Id. at 185, 603 P.2d at 77. 
27 UNIFORM BRAIN DEATH Acr (1980). 
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of all functioning of the brain including the brain stem, is dead." The 
Harvard Medical School test, discussed by the Code commentators,28 
defines "cessation of life" as "brain death" which occurs when there is 
"(1) unresponsiveness to normally painful stimuli; (2) absence of spon-
taneous movements or breathing; and (3) absence of reflexes." 
The court adopted the modern view and concluded that the victim 
had suffered brain death before the supports had been withdrawn, 
hence the defendant could properly be convicted of a homicide of-
fense.29 No doubt, the victim was dead before the support systems were 
withdrawn, and the defendant was the one who killed him. Without 
any statutory guidelines as to the definition of death, however, all par-
ties were acting under a severe handicap in predicting the result in the 
case, surely raising some due process concerns. It is just this sort of case 
which the Model Penal Code could and should reach. The failure to 
define the crucial term, "death," is unfortunate, though perhaps not fa-
tal. The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in 
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, established by Con-
gress in 1978, has just recommended that the states endorse the concept 
that human life ends when the brain stops functioning. 30 The recom-
mendation is receiving a good deal of attention and is likely to have a 
major impact in the near future on the law in this area. Still, it is both 
disappointing and surprising that the draftsmen of the Model Penal 
Code chose not to develop their own definition of this term.31 
It is, finally, worth noting that under the homicide definition, 
"human being" is a person "who has been born and is alive." Such a 
definition maintains the earliest common law view that homicide of-
fenses are only committed when the victim is born alive: 
If a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise killeth it in 
her wombe, or if a man beat her, whereby the childe dyeth in her body, 
and she is delivered of a dead childe, this is a great misprision [i.e., misde-
meanor], and no murder; but if the childe be born alive and dyeth of the 
potion, battery, or other cause, this is murder; for in law it is accounted a 
reasonable creature, in rerum natura, when it is born alive.32 
One of the obvious reasons for so limiting the definition was to avoid 
28 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 10. 
29 124 Ariz. at 185, 603 P.2d at 77. 
30 The full statute is as follows: 
An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respir-
atory function, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including 
the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be made in accordance with 
accepted medical standards. 
3! This is particularly surprising in light of the approach taken by the Code in the murder 
and manslaughter sections. The draftsmen there were meticulous in their phraseology and 
attempted to specify the elements of the offenses. Se-e zi!fi-a text accompanying notes 45-138. 
32 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES 58 (1648). 
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dealing with the abortion question in the homicide area. "Although 
there may remain a role for the penal law in the field of abortion, there 
is at least a continuing necessity to avoid enmeshing this quite distinct 
problem in the law of homicide."33 On this point the draftsmen and 
commentators are certainly correct. The legal issues surrounding abor-
tion are complex and diverse, but they are distinct from those normally 
involved with the law of criminal homicide. It is preferable to deal with 
such issues apart from the homicide area. 34 
In one area, though, the limited definition of human being raises 
some question, as recognized by the commentators. "Whatever one's 
evaluation of [abortion], it seems useful to distinguish abortion from the 
intentional killing of a fetus without the mother's consent. As a matter 
of policy, it may be thought appropriate to punish such conduct as 
murder."35 
Keeler v. Supenor Court 36 demonstrates this point very well. The de-
fendant's former wife became pregnant by another man. One day, on 
an isolated mountain road the defendant encountered her, saw that she 
was pregnant and "pushed her against the car, shoved his knee into her 
abdomen, and struck her in the face with several blows."37 There was 
little question that the defendant intended to do severe harm to both the 
mother and the fetus.38 The head of the fetus was found to be severely 
fractured, and it was delivered stillborn. The defendant was convicted 
under a statute which defined murder as "the unlawful killing of a 
human being, with malice aforethought."39 The dissenting justices ar-
gued that the conviction was proper, for the question "whether a homi-
cide occurred . . . would be determined by medical testimony regarding 
the capability of the child to have survived prior to the defendant's 
act."40 The majority of the California supreme court disagreed, finding 
that under the usual murder statute the legislature could not have in-
tended to cover the defendant's actions.41 If it had so intended, the stat-
33 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 12. 
34 The abortion issues are dealt with in § 230.3 of the Code. 
35 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 12. 
36 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970). 
37 Id. at 623, 470 P.2d at 618, 87 Cal. Rptr.at 482. 
38 After noticing that his former wife was pregnant, the defendant exclaimed, "I'm going 
to stomp it out of you." Id. 
39 CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1970). 
40 2 Cal. 3d at 641, 470 P.2d at 632, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 496 (Burke, C.J., dissenting). The 
medical testimony was clear that the fetus had an excellent chance of survival, but for the 
defendant's actions. "'Baby Girl' Vogt, ... had reached the 35th week of development, 
[and] had a 96 percent chance of survival .... " 2 Cal. 3d at 639-40, 470 P.2d at 630, 87 
Cal. Rptr. at 494 (Burke, C.J., dissenting). 
41 It is the policy of this state to construe a penal statute as favorably to the defendants 
as its language and the circumstances of its application may reasonably permit; just as in 
the case of a question of fact, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable 
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ute "would deny him due process of law."42 
One could certainly draft a statute which does not deal with the 
abortion situation, but does make into a homicide offense the beating of 
a woman which results in the child being delivered stillborn.43 What is 
perplexing about the commentators' view of such a statute is that they 
and the draftsmen have simply chosen not to deal with the sensitive 
question. Many judges and legislators have grappled with the issue of 
whether such a killing constitutes a homicide offense;44 it is regrettable 
that the Code does not offer guidance in this difficult area. 
MURDER 
The Model Penal Code, section 210.2, provides that 
(1) Except as provided in Section 210.3(1)(b),l45l criminal homicide 
constitutes murder when: 
(a) it is committed purposely or knowingly; or 
(b) it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting ex-
treme indifference to the value of human life. Such recklessness and 
indifference are presumed if the actor is engaged or is an accomplice in 
the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing 
or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercourse by 
force or threat of force, arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape. 
It is in the definition of murder that the Model Penal Code has 
made its greatest contribution. In an area fraught with confusion and 
contradiction, the draftsmen and commentators have sought to bring 
clarity and uniformity. On the whole, they have succeeded. At com-
doubt as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of language used in a 
statute .... We hold that in adopting the definition of murder in Penal Code section 
187 the Legislature intended to exclude from its reach the act of killing an unborn fetus 
The first essential of due process is fair warning of the act which is made punishable 
as a crime. "That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently 
explicit to inform those who are subject to what conduct on their part will render them 
liable to its penalties, is a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary 
notions of fair play and the settled rules of law" .... "No one may be required at peril 
of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are enti-
tled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids." ... 
This requirement of fair warning is reflected in the constitutional prohibition 
against the enactment of ex post facto laws . . . . When a new penal statute is applied 
retrospectively to make punishable an act which was not criminal at the time it was 
performed, the defendant has been given no advance notice consistent with due process. 
And precisely the same effect occurs when such an act is made punishable under a preex-
isting statute but by means of an unforeseeable;umi:ziz/ enlargement thereof. 
ld. at 631, 633-34, 470 P.2d at 624, 626, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 488, 490. 
42 /d. at 639, 470 P.2d at 630, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 494. 
43 Illinois and California have both passed statutes which preclude application of the 
homicide statute in cases where abortion was legally authorized. Su CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 187(b) (West Supp. 1981); ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, § 9-l.l (1981) (specifically referring to 
the new homicide offense of "feticide."). 
44 &e COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 11-12. 
45 This is the manslaugher section. &e itifia text accompanying notes 98-138. 
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mon law, murder was the unlawful killing of another human being with 
"malice aforethought." The term "malice aforethought," often clipped 
to malice, has no specific definition suitable for use in the area of homi-
cide.46 Instead, it is thought that killings in four situations evidence a 
sufficiently criminal mind as to constitute murder. First, of course, mal-
ice includes an intent to kill.47 Second, malice means an intent to inflict 
grievous bodily harm. Third, the term includes the state of mind pres-
ent under the genteel terminology of "depraved heart" or "abandoned 
and malignant heart." This category covers those cases in which the de-
fendant acted with extreme recklessness. The fourth situation, and the 
most difficult for this writer,48 consists of killings committed during the 
course of certain other crimes, felony murder. This clarity of categoriza-
tion in the malice aforethought area may be more apparent than real, 
for states were hardly consistent in the application of the doctrine, while 
still others sought to embellish the term by statutory definition.49 
The confusion in this area was further compounded by the adop-
tion of statutes dividing murder into degrees, a position first taken by 
the state of Pennsylvania in 1794. "The thrust of this reform was to 
confine the death penalty, which was then mandatory on conviction of 
any common-law murder, to homicides judged particularly heinous."50 
The murder was deemed sufficiently horrible if the killing had been 
"perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other 
kind of willful, deliberate or premeditated killing."51 While one might 
argue whether or not these standards were appropriate, it at least ap-
peared clear what was meant by the statutory terminology. Unfortu-
nately, the phrase "willful, deliberate or premeditated killing" in 
practice was not at all clear. ' 
The leading discussion of the definition of the terms under first de-
gree murder statutes is probably Judge Leventhal's opinion in Austin v. 
United States .52 There the defendant had brutally stabbed the victim to 
46 Unlike, for instance, the definition of malice in the defamation area which refers to 
knowledge of the falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 
376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
47 The intent to kill will normally be murder unless committed in the heat of passion 
under the manslaughter statutes. See i'n.fta text accompanying notes 103-127. 
48 See z;yia discussion at text accompanying notes 73-97. 
49 The commentators refer to the Georgia code sections, since repealed, which defined the 
term as "that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature, which 
is manifested by external circumstances capable of prooP' or implied malice "where no con-
siderable provocation appears and where all the circumstances of the killing show an aban-
doned and malignant heart." COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 17. 
50 ld. at 16. 
51 This reference excludes the felony murder provisions which were present in the statutes 
which otherwise divided murder into degrees. 
52 382 F.2d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
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death, inflicting dozens of knife wounds all over her body. The defend-
ant was convicted of first degree murder after the trial judge had in-
structed the jury that the deliberation and premeditation under the first 
degree murder statute could be "in the nature of hours, minutes, or 
seconds."53 Judge Leventhal began by exploring the rationale for the 
first degree murder statute: 
Statutes like ours, which distinguish deliberate and premeditated murder 
from other murder, reflect a belief that one who meditates an intent to kill 
and then deliberately executes it is more dangerous, more culpable or less 
capable of reformation than one who kills on sudden impulse; or that the 
prospect of the death penalty is more likely to deter men from deliberate 
than from impulsive murder. The deliberate killer is guilty of first degree 
murder; the impulsive killer is not.54 
What the legislature had in mind was "that the determination to kill 
was reached calmly and in cold blood rather than under impulse or the 
heat of passion and was reached some appreciable time prior to the 
homicide."55 Thus, the trial judge's instruction to the jury was errone-
ous; by referring to the premeditation element as one which could be 
committed in a matter of seconds, he had essentially converted virtually 
all murders into first degree murders, an intent the legislature could not 
have had.56 
Austin illustrates well the problems which the degree statutes cre-
ated. The Model Penal Code approach rejects the degrees principle and 
instead provides a clear and healthy balance between the requirements 
of particular states of mind, and severe punishment for particular types 
53 The court stated to the jury: 
It is your duty to determine from all of the facts and the circumstances which have been 
presented to you in this case that you may find surrounding the killing on April 
24 . . . whether there was any reflection and consideration amounting to deliberation 
by the defendant . . . . Now if there was such deliberation, even though it be of an 
exceedingly brief duration, that is in itself, so far as the deliberation is concerned, is 
sufficient. Because it is the fact of deliberation rather than the length of time it required 
that is important. Although some time, that is there must be some time to deliberate in 
the mind of the defendant Austin the premeditation and the deliberation. As I have told 
you before, the time itself may be in the nature of hours, minutes, or seconds. But there 
must be the deliberation and the premeditation. 
ld. at 133, n.l. 
54 /d. at 134 (quoting Bullock v. United States, 122 F.2d 213, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1941)). 
55 ld. at 134. 
56 The court stated: 
In homespun terminology, intentional murder is in the first degree if committed in 
cold blood, and is murder in the second degree if committed on impulse or in the sudden 
heat of passion. These are the archtypes, that clarify by contrast. The real facts may be 
hard to classify and may lie between the poles. A sudden passion, like lust, rage, or 
jealousy, may spawn an impulsive intent yet persist long enough and in such a way as to 
permit that intent to become the subject of a further reflection and weighing of conse-
quences and hence to take on the character of a murder executed without compunction 
and "in cold blood." 
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of killings. 5 7 As indicated earlier, under the traditional view of malice, 
murder was committed by a killing accompanied by an intent to kill, an 
intent to inflict great bodily harm, or a "depraved heart."58 In the ab-
stract, the terms-at least the first two--may be straightforward. In 
practice, however, the terms were difficult to apply in the cases in which 
the actor probably knew that he would cause death or great bodily 
harm, but there was some question as to whether that result was his goal 
or his purpose. For instance, did the husband intend to kill his wife when 
he ordered her into the river and she drowned?59 Did the "stepmother" 
intend to kill her six year old girl when she "whipped" the child continu-
ously?60 Similarly, did the defendant intend to inflict grave bodily harm 
on his wife when he struck her and she bumped her head on the car?61 
In these cases the defendants certainly knew of the likely consequences 
of their acts, but some doubt must be raised as to whether they intended 
such consequences. 
The Model Penal Code avoids this fine distinction between intent 
and knowledge by allowing for a murder conviction if the killing was 
done in a purposeful or knowing fashion. The commentators properly 
remark that for homicide purposes there ought not to be any distinction 
between an intentional killing and a knowing killing. The Code thus 
rejects those statutes which so distinguish, either with regard to the defi-
nitions of the offenses or the grading of them for purposes of punish-
ment.62 The commentators also make clear the nature of proof required 
for intent, purpose or knowledge. That is, under the Code the judge 
may not instruct the jury to presume that the defendant intended 
the natural or probable consequences of his acts. Liability under Section 
210.2(1)(a) may not rest merely on a finding that the defendant purpose-
fully or knowingly did something which had death of another as its natural 
and probable consequence. Rather, the prosecution must establish that 
the defendant engaged in conduct with the conscious objective of causing 
death of another or at least with awareness that death of another was prac-
tically certain to result from his act.63 
This conclusion is quite proper; murder is the highest homicide offense 
precisely because the defendant's culpability is the greatest. A murder 
57 Id. at 137. The punishment provisions of the Code are not treated in this article. A 
person convicted of murder, however, may be sentenced to death under certain circumstances 
pursuant to § 210.6. 
58 Or by a killing during the course of the commission of a felony. See il?fra text accompa-
nying notes 73-97. 
59 Yes, he knew she could not swim. State v. Myers, 7 N.J. 465, 81 A.2d 710 (1951). 
60 Yes. State v. Lamborn, 452 S.W.2d 2'16 (Mo. 1970). 
61 Yes, he should have immediately taken his wife to the hospital. People v. Geiger, 10 
Mich. App. 348, 159 N.W.2d 383 (1968). 
62 E.g., WISe. STAT. §§ 940.01-.03 (1979). See COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 20. 
63 Id. at 20-21. 
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charge should not stand upon so tenuous a ground as what somebody 
else knew, or what a natural consequence should have been. Of course, 
direct evidence of intent or knowledge is not required, and the jury may 
be told that it can infer the necessary state of mind from the acts of the 
defendant. That, however, is quite different-and far more justifiable-
than an instruction as to presumptions of natural and probable 
consequences. 
Suppose the defendant does not intend to inflict grievous bodily 
harm, does not intend to kill, and does not know that the death will 
occur. Should the defendant be convicted of murder under other cir-
cumstances? Even today, few people would contest the murder convic-
tion of the defendant who shoots a gun into a room,64 shoots it into a 
moving automobile,65 or takes a small child and literally throws her into 
her bedroom.66 When death occurs the actor is seen as greatly at fault, 
even though he may not have intended that death would result, or may 
not have known that the victim would die. He is held for murder be-
cause he consciously disregarded a grave risk to a fellow human being. 
In common law terms, he has evidenced an "abandoned and malignant 
heart." The Code follows this rationale, but seeks to clarify the meaning 
of the rule. The defendant can be held for murder when the act is 
"committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indif-
ference to the value of human life." Though the language is still a bit 
hazy, it is a vast improvement over the common law terminology67 and 
it achieves its "primary purpose of communicating to jurors in ordinary 
language the task expected of them. "68 
Two points should be made concerning the extreme indifference 
formulation. First, it is not indifference to any risk which will give rise to 
a murder charge in this context. It is a risk which demonstrates the 
defendant's total disregard for human life; it is the shooting of the gun, 
the brutal treatment of the young child. Any action short of this "ex-
treme indifference" can still be considered as a homicidal act, but only 
at the level of manslaughter rather than murder.69 Second, it should be 
64 People v. Jematowski, 238 N.Y. 188, 144 N.E. 497 (1924). 
65 Hill v. Commonweath, 239 Ky. 646, 40 S.W.2d 261 (1931). 
66 Seidler v. State, 64 Wise. 2d 456, 219 N.W.2d 320 (1974). 
67 The language in the Code is certainly an improvement over other academic efforts in 
the area. One law professor has defined murder to include unintentional homicide "by an act 
so extremely dangerous and disregardful of the lives and safety of others as to be wantonly 
disregardful of such interests according to the standard of the conduct of a reasonable man 
under the circumstances." Moreland, A Suggested Homii:i(fe Statute .for Kentucky, 41 KY. L.J. 139, 
146 (1953). Another has summarized the common law version of unintentional murder as 
involving "wanton and willful disregard of an unreasonable human risk." R. PERKINS, 
CRIMINAL LAw 36-37, 46 (2d ed. 1969). 
68 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 25. 
69 Section 210.3 defines manslaughter as an act which is "committed recklessly." 
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stressed that the murder charge can only be sustained on a showing of 
conscious disregard of the risk of harm to others. It is not enough to 
prove that the defendant should have been aware of the probable conse-
quences, or that other people knew or would have known of the conse-
quences. The murder charge requires a very high degree of culpability: 
the actual awareness of this very great risk. The famous English case of 
Regina v. Ward, 70 therefore, would not be valid under the Code, as noted 
by the commentators. The defendant was a man of "sub-normal" intel-
ligence who was charged with the murder of a small child. He testified 
that he had picked up the crying child and shook her until she had 
stopped. He had no intention to harm her seriously and apparently did 
not understand that he was harming her. The thrust of his defense was 
rejected by the trial judge who instructed the jury that 
if, when he did the act which he did do, he must as a reasonable man have 
contemplated that death or grievous bodily ha.-m was likely to result to the 
child as a result of what he did, then, members of the jury, if you are 
satisfied about that, he is guilty of murder. 71 
Under the Code, this instruction is erroneous due to the reference to the 
reliance on the standard of conduct of a "reasonable man."72 
The commentators state several times that under the Code a de-
fendant can only be convicted of murder if he or she killed purposely, 
knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indif-
ference to the value of human life. The felony murder rule as such is not 
found in the Code. Still, the rule may have been adopted sub silento by 
the draftsmen in the form of the following presumption: "Such reckless-
ness and indifference are presumed if the actor is engaged or is an ac-
complice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after 
committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape, or deviate sexual 
intercourse ... arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape." To 
determine if the rule finds new life in the Code we must first examine 
the traditional felony murder doctrine. 
At common law, all defendants committing a felony were held for 
murder if the killing occurred during the course of that felony. 
Problems arose in the application of the rule. There have been cases in 
70 [1956] 1 Q,B. 351. 
71 /d. at 354-55. 
72 As the commentators point out, Parliament overruled Ward in the Criminal Justice Act 
of 1967, ch. 80, § 8: 
A court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offense,-
(a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his 
actions by reason only of its being a natural and probable consequence of those 
actions; but 
(b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the 
evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the 
circumstances. 
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which the issue was whether a "killing" had occurred if the victim of the 
crime dropped dead from a heart attack. 73 In other cases the defense 
contended that the felony murder rule did not apply unless the killing 
was in furtherance of the felony. 74 In numerous cases the defendants 
asserted that the killing was not during the course of the crime because 
the death occurred during the escape portion of the criminal endeavor. 75 
Still, in virtually every American jurisdiction 76 the rule was a well estab-
lished alternative to the other forms of malice aforethought for purposes 
of proving murder. 
The purpose of the felony murder rule has never been entirely 
clear. Chief Justice Traynor stated that it was "to deter felons from 
killing negligently or accidentally by holding them strictly responsible 
for killings they commit."77 At a time when all felonies were punishable 
by death "it made little difference whether the actor was convicted of 
murder or of the underlying felony because the sanction was the 
same. " 78 A broad based felony murder rule is indefensible in the mod-
ern world, where all kinds of acts which are not particularly dangerous 
to life and are not given severe penalties are designated felonies. 79 As 
the commentators properly remark, under the rule, the "homicide, as 
73 People v. Stamp, 2 Cal. App. 3d 203, 82 Cal. Rptr. 598, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1969) 
("So long as life is s,hortened as a result of the felonious act, it does not matter that the victim 
might have died soon anyway. In this respect, the robber takes his victim as he finds him.''). 
74 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Waters, 491 Pa. 85, 92, 418 A.2d 312, 316 (1980) (it was 
"error for the trial judge to refuse to instruct the jury that the state was required to show the 
conduct causing the death was done in furtherance of the design to commit the felony.''). 
75 See, e.g., Whitman v. People, 161 Colo. 110,420 P.2d 416 (1966) (felony murder rule 
applied to killings which occurred during the escape from the commission of an offense). 
76 Until the last decade, only Ohio had abandoned the felony murder rule. As pointed 
out by the commentators, however, vestiges of the rule remain even in Ohio. 
A close relative of the felony-murder rule is continued, however, under the label of im-
puted intent. A person who joins with another in a crime of violence is presumed to have 
agreed to whatever acts may be necessary to accomplish the criminal objective. Thus, 
each participant in an armed robbery may be presumed to have had a purpose to kill in 
connection with an unplanned but foreseeable homicide committed incident to the 
robbery. 
COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 33 n.80. 
77 People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777, 781, 402 P.2d 130, 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 445 
(1965). 
78 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 31 n.74, states: 
The primary use of the felony murder rule at common law therefore was to deal with a 
homicide that occurred in furtherance of an attempted felony that failed. Since attempts 
were punished as misdemeanors, . . . the use of the felony murder rule allowed the 
courts to punish the actor in the same manner as if his· attempt had succeeded. Thus, a 
conviction for attempted robbery was a misdemeanor, but a homicide committed in the 
attempt was murder and punishable by death. 
79 In Illinois, for instance, the following offenses are classified as felonies in the criminal 
code. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 28-1.1 (1981) (syndicated gambling);§ 29-1, 29-2 (offering or 
accepting a bribe); § 31-4 (obstructing justice);§ 32-3 (subornation of perjury);§ 32-8 (tam-
pering with public records); § 21-1 (criminal damage to property); and§ 17-3 (forgery). 
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distinct from the underlying felony, was thus an offense of strict liabil-
ity."80 It is difficult, indeed, to justify a murder conviction under such a 
strict liability rationale. As a practical matter, there has been no evi-
dence to demonstrate that the felony murder rule serves a useful purpose 
in actually deterring felons from killing negligently or accidentally.81 
More substantively, "it remains indefensible in principle to use the sanc-
tions that the law employs to deal with murder unless there is at least a 
finding that the actor's conduct manifested an extreme indifference to 
the value of human life. "82 
State legislators and judges have recognized the validity of the criti-
cism in the Commentaries and have stepped back from the formerly 
broad view of the felony murder rule. As the commentators discuss, the 
rule has been limited in a number of significant ways, whether by stat-
ute or court decision .. In some states only particularly dangerous felonies 
are covered under the rule.83 In other states, the felony must be one 
which is independent of the homicide itself. Hence, assault with a 
deadly weapon could not be the base felony under the rule because the 
assault is an offense included in the charge ofhomicide.84 In some juris-
dictions the punishment has been downgraded.85 Still other states have 
flatly rejected the felony murder rule.86 Foremost of these jurisdictions 
is the state of Michigan which declared its position in the case of People v. 
Aaron.87 The state supreme court first looked to "the most basic princi-
ple of the criminal law in general . . . criminal liability for causing a 
80 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 31. 
81 Indeed, the evidence is somewhat to the contrary. ''There is no basis in experience for 
thinking that homicides which the evidence nzalces accidental occur with disproportionate fre-
quency in connection with specified felonies." COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 38 (emphasis 
in original). The statistical evidence cited by the commentators shows that the number of all 
homicides which occur during the course of robbery, burglary, and rape is somewhat lower 
than might otherwise be expected. Id. at 38 n.96. 
82 Id. at 38-39. 
83 A number of codes specify the felonies which can be the basis for the rule. &e, e.g., ILL. 
REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (1979). Some courts have attempted to limit the felony murder rule 
to the felonies which, in the abstract, are inherently dangerous to human life. For criticism of 
the rule, see COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 35. 
84 For a dissenting view, see State v. Thompson, 88 Wash. 3d 13, 558 P.2d 202, appeal 
dismissed, 434 U.S. 898 (1977). 
85 Alaska, Louisiana, New York, Pennsylvania, and Utah have reduced the felony murder 
crime to second degree murder. See discussion in People v. Aaron, ziifi'a, 409 Mich. 672, 689, 
299 N.W.2d 304, 315 {1980). 
86 Even in those states which have not acted in such drastic fashion, severe restrictions 
have been imposed with respect to the foreseeability of the offense, especially with regard to 
killings not directly caused by the defendant or a co-defendant. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 
254 So. 2d 548 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Jackson v. State, 92 N.M. 461, 589 P.2d 1052 
(1979). Contra, People v. Hickman, 59 Ill.2d 89, 319 N.E.2d 511 (1974); Jackson v. State, 286 
Md. 430, 408 A.2d 711 (1979). 
87 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980). 
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particular result is not justified in the absence of some culpable mental 
state in respect to that result."88 The court had little difficulty in con-
cluding that 
[t]he most fundamental characteristic of the felony-murder rule violates 
this basic principle in that it punishes all homicides, committed in the per-
petration or attempted perpetration of proscribed felonies whether inten-
tional, unintentional or accidental, without the necessity of proving the 
relation between the homicide and the perpetrator's state of mind. This is 
most evident when a killing is done by one of a group of co-felons. The 
felony-murder rule completely ignores the concept of determination of 
guilt on the basis of individual misconduct. The felony-murder rule thus 
"erodes the relation between criminal liability and moral culpability."89 
The court then speculated that the impact of the abolition of the felony 
murder rule would be limited: 
From a practical standpoint, the abolition of the category of malice arising 
from the intent to commit the underlying felony should have little effect on 
the result of the majority of cases. In many cases where felony murder has 
been applied, the use of the doctrine was unnecessary because the other 
types of malice could have been inferred from the evidence. 
Abrogation of this rule does not make irrelevant the fact that a death 
occurred in the course of a felony. A jury can properly infer malice from 
evidence that a defendant intentionally set in motion a force likely to cause 
death or great bodily harm. . . . Thus, whenever a killing occurs in the 
perpetration or attempted perpetration of an inherently dangerous felony, 
. . . in order tQ establish malice the jury may consider the "nature of the 
underlying felony and the circumstances surrounding its commission." 
If the jury concludes that malice existed, they can find murder. . . . 
As previously noted, in many circumstances the commission of a fel-
ony, particularly one involving violence or the use of force, will indicate an 
intention to kill, an intention to cause great bodily harm, or wanton or 
willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of defendant's 
behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm. Thus, the felony-murder 
rule is not necessary to establish mens rea in these cases. 90 
While few courts or legislatures have gone as far as the Aaron 
court,91 it is beyond dispute that the modern trend is for severe limita-
tion of the traditional felony murder rule. One would, therefore, hope 
for and expect repudiation of the rule in the Model Penal Code and its 
Commentaries. The rule is expressly repudicated, but the essense of it 
seems to survive. The Code "creates a presumption of the required reck-
88 /d. at 708, 299 N.W.2d at 316. 
89 /d., 299 N.W.2d at 317. 
90 /d. at 729-30,299 N.W.2d at 327. Sualso COMMENTARIES,mpra note 1, at 37 ("For the 
vast majority of cases it is probably true that homicide occurring during the commission or 
attempted commission of a felony is murder independent of the felony-murder rule.'~. 
91 In addition to Ohio, the states of Kentucky and Hawaii have specifically abolished the 
felony murder doctrine. See discussion in People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. at 690, 299 N.W.2d at 
314. 
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lessness and extreme indifference, however, if a homicide occurs during 
the commission or attempted commission of robbery, sexual attack, ar-
son, burglary, kidnapping, or felonious escape."92 This presumption 
also applies to the person who is an accomplice to the commission of one 
of the specified crimes. The important question is whether this pre-
sumption differs in material form from the felony murder. 
The Model Penal Code's approach is different from the traditional 
rule in that the jurors are said to be free to disregard the "presump-
tion."93 Thus, the commentators conclude that the effect of the Code 
provision "is to abandon felony murder as a separate basis for establish-
ing liability for homicide."94 Two responses must be made to this con-
clusion. First, there is considerable doubt whether the jurors will 
disregard the presumption, especially in cases in which no independent 
evidence is offered as to the recklessness state of mind. That is, as I read 
the presumption, the jurors may find (indeed, are encouraged to find) 
the necessary state of mind with no evidence other than the commission 
of the named felonies. This looks suspiciously like the felony murder 
rule. Second, and more fundamentally, what possible basis can exist for 
the presumption here? The commentators refer to the presumption "as 
a concession to the facilitation of proof."95 If, however, the felony mur-
der rule is wrong because it fails to require "a finding ~hat_ the actor's 
conduct manifested an extreme indifference to the value of human 
life,"96 it would seem that the presumption is just as wrong. A finding of 
extreme indifference is required, but that requirement can be met 
merely by a showing that the defendant or a co-defendant committed a 
particular felony. The draftsmen and commentators remark that 
"[p]rincipled argument in favor of the felony-murder doctrine is hard to 
find,"97 yet it is also hard to find a principled argument in favor of the 
presumption in the Code. 
MANSLAUGHTER 
The Model Penal Code, section 210.3, provides that 
92 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 29. 
93 Id. at 30. It is doubtful that the commentators mean to continue using the term "pre-
sumption" in this context. It appears more likely that they intend to use the term "inference" 
which would allow the jury to reject the evidence with no contrary showing. If they truly 
mean presumption in the sense that the burden of proving this element (recklessness) is on the 
defendant, serious constitutional questions would have to be raised in light of Mullaney v. 
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) and Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). See gmerai!J' 
Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of JustiCe: Burdens of Persuasion in Cn"minal Cases, 86 YALE 
L.J. 1299 (1977). See also ziyra note 124. 
94 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 30, 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 39. 
97 Id. at 37. 
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(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when: 
(a) it is committed recklessly; or 
(b) a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed 
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for 
which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of 
such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a 
person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes 
them to be. 
At the time the Model Penal Code was drafted the state of the law 
with respect to the offense of manslaughter was muddled, to say the 
least. Some states divided the crime into two types, voluntary and invol-
untary.98 Other states did not even attempt to define the crime, simply 
incorporating the common law offense. At common law, manslaughter 
was a "catch-all" category covering homicides which were not consid-
ered murder. This usually involved intentional killings accompanied by 
adequate provocation and reckless killings that did not rise to the level 
of "depraved heart" murder.99 Still other states adopted statutes which 
divided the crime into degrees. 100 Hence, in a very real sense, the major 
contribution of the draftsmen here was to bring some uniformity to the 
crime in those states which have adopted the Code. 
The first type of manslaughter recognized by the Code is the reck-
less killing of another. Carefully distinguishing negligent homicide, 101 
the Code mandates a showing that the defendant "consciously disre-
gards a substantial ar1d injustifiable risk." It is considerably more diffi-
cult to prove this reckless conduct than to prove negligent acts; the 
section requires behavior which is "a gross deviation from the standard 
of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe," and proof is re-
quired of a "conscious disregard of perceived homicidal risk."102 If the 
risk creation demonstrates "extreme indifference," the crime is murder 
rather than manslaughter. 
The second type of manslaughter is the killing in the heat of pas-
98 The traditional view is that voluntary manslaughter is committed when there is an 
intent to kill, but no malice aforethought. Involuntary manslaughter is committed without 
this intent to kill, but upon otherwise culpable behavior. The division, however, was not so 
explicitly recognized as in many of the statutory provisions. See COMMENTARIES, supra note 
1, at 44-48. 
99 This form of manslaughter thus required more culpability than for ordinary civil negli-
gence, but less than for the "abandoned heart" murder. Id. at 44. 
100 Foremost among these statutes was the New York law which allowed for first degree 
manslaughter when the killing occurred in the heat of passion in a cruel and unusual manner 
and second degree manslaughter in the heat of passion, but not by means either cruel or 
unusual. N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 1050, 1052 (McKinney 1909) (repealed 1965). 
101 Section 210.4 states:· "Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide when it is 
committed negligently." The discussion of the commentators in the section is quite helpful, 
but reference to it in this article is deleted because of space limitations. 
102 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 53. 
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sion as a result of severe provocation. Wharton states the policy for al-
lowing a lesser penalty even though the killing was intentional: "As a 
concession to human frailty, a killing, which would otherwise constitute 
murder, is mitigated to voluntary manslaughter."103 The common law 
had difficulties defining this aspect of the crime and applying it in a 
manner consistent with the underlying policy. The greater the heat of 
passion and the more severe the provocation, the greater chance that the 
crime would be considered manslaughter rather than murder. The oft-
stated theory was that if this was the kind of incident which would cause 
even a reasonable person to lose self-control the law ought not hold the 
defendant to the sanction for murder. The problem, though, was that 
"a reasonable person does not kill even when provoked." 104 As ex-
plained by Wechsler and Michael, the policy rationale stated above is 
nonetheless served by allowing mitigation to the manslaughter charge: 
[T]he more strongly [most persons] would be moved to kill by circum-
stances of the sort which provoked the actor to the homicidal act, and the 
more difficulty they would experience in resisting the impulse to which he 
yielded, the less does his succumbing serve to differentiate his character 
from theirs.105 
The Model Penal Code has sought to effectively eliminate three 
major problems involved in applying the provocation rules: first, the 
requirement that the provocation be sufficient to affect even the reason-
able person; second, the view that words alone were insufficient to con-
stitute adequate provocation; and third, the provision that there could 
be no break in time between the provocation and the defendant's action. 
Determining what a reasonable person would or would not do 
under difficult circumstances has never been an easy task for finders of 
fact, as seen in the many conflicting negligence cases in tort law. 10 6 The 
reasonable person standard does, however, allow for a specific objective 
standard upon which persons could rely. In the criminal context, how-
ever, some question was raised as to whether the reasonable person stan-
dard should be used to determine adequate provocation. As noted by 
·the commentators, "[a] taunting attack that would seem trivial to the 
103 2 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAw § 153 (14th ed. 1978). 
104 CoMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 56. 
105 Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Ifomid'de II, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 1261, 
1281 (1937). 
106 Learned Hand attempted to devise a formulation to assist in the tort negligence deci-
sion. He wrote that the negligence determination "is a function of three variables: (1) The 
probability [of the result]; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury ... ; (3) the burden of 
adequate precautions." He went on to explain: "Possibly it serves to bring this notion into 
relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the 
burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B [is 
less than] PL." United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2nd Cir. 194 7). 
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ordinary citizen may be extremely threatening to the blind man."107 
Commonwealth v. Staslco 108 demonstrates well the refusal to consider the 
individual traits of the defendant which might have led him to be pro-
voked. The defendant attempted at trial to offer medical evidence to 
show his "tendency to have a short temper and erupt in sudden rages." 
The trial judge's refusal to allow the evidence into the record was 
affirmed: 
The purpose of the testimony was to show that, in the case of this partic-
ular accused, there was sufficient provocation for the attack. This evidence 
was clearly inadmissible: "Our law is quite explicit that the determination 
of whether a certain quantum of provocation is sufficient to support the 
defense of voluntary manslaughter is purely an objective standard .... " 
The test for adequate provocation is "whether a reasonable man, con-
fronted with this series of events, became impassioned to the extent that his 
mind was incapable of cool reflection." 109 
Indeed, in one case evidence was refused, even though the court con-
ceded that the evidence would have shown the defendant to be "a man 
with a low intelligence quotient and a history of mental disturbance 
... [as the] objective standard precludes consideration of the innate 
peculiarities of the individual defendant." 110 
The Code seeks to start anew in this area, for it "sweeps away the 
rigid rules that limited provision to certain defined circumstances. In-
stead, it casts the issue in phrases that have no common-law antecedents 
and hence no accumulated doctrinal content."111 Manslaughter is 
shown when the killing is "committed under the influence of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explana-
tion or excuse." While the Code does retain the reasonable person stan-
dard, this requirement may be met by looking to "the viewpoint of a 
person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes 
them to be." It thus appears that the Code strikes a healthy balance 
between the opposing positions. Some reasonable person standard must 
be met, so that the section "preserves the essentially objective character 
of the inquiry and erects a barrier against debilitating individualization 
of the legal standard."112 Still, the reasonableness must be assessed 
"from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation." "[I]t is clear 
that personal handicaps and some external circumstances must be taken 
107 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 56. 
108 471 Pa. 373, 370 A.2d 350 (1977). 
109 Id. at 384, 370 A.2d at 356 (guoting Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 389-90, 
292 A.2d 286, 289-90 (1972)). 
110 State v. Jackson, 226 Kan. 302, 309, 597 P.2d 255, 259 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 952 
(1980). &e also Bedder v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1954) 2 All E.R. 801. But see 
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Camplin [1978) 2 All E.R. 168. 
111 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 61. 
112 Id. at 62. 
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into account. Thus, blindness, shock from traumatic injury, and ex-
treme grief are all easily read into the term 'situation.' " 113 
The common law also had trouble defining the sort of external ac-
tivity which would give rise to the provocation defense. The rule tradi-
tionally was that "words alone, however scurrilous or insulting, will not 
furnish the adequate provocation required.'' 114 The major exception to 
the "mere words" rule, as noted by the commentators, "concerned infor-
mational words disclosing a fact that would have been adequate provo-
cation had the actor observed it himself,"115 such as the case in which 
the defendant is told, "I just killed your child.'' Under the code, no 
explicit rule is promulgated with respect to "mere words.'' The Code 
draftsmen recognized that the important question "cannot be resolved 
successfully by categorization of conduct. It must be confronted directly 
on the facts of each case.''116 In most cases words alone will not be suffi-
cient provocation. In the highly unusual case, however, mere words 
might be sufficient to cause even the reasonable person to lose self-
control.117 
At common law a manslaughter claim was not allowed if there was 
a cooling off period between the provocation and the killing. The final 
contribution of the Code in this area is the elimination of this "sudden 
provocation" element. The reason for the strict rule was that "[f]or the 
reasonable man, at least, passion subsides and reason reasserts its sway 
as the provoking event grows stale.''118 The most famous case in the 
area, discussed by the commentators, is State v. Gounagi(zs 119 where "the 
deceased committed sodomy on the unconscious defendant and subse-
quently spread the news of his accomplishment. Those who learned of 
the event taunted and ridiculed the defendant until he finally lost con-
trol and killed his assailant some two weeks after the sodomy."120 
This theory of the cumulative effect of reminders of former wrongs, not of 
new acts of provocation by the deceased, is contrary to the idea of sudden 
anger as understood in the doctrine of mitigation. In the nature of the 
thing sudden anger cannot be cumulative. A provocation which does not 
cause instant resentment, but which is only resented after being thought 
upon and brooded over, is not a provocation sufficient in law to reduce 
113 Id. 
114 State v. Castro, 92 N.M. 585, 590, 592 P.2d 185, 187 {1979) (guoting State v. Nevares, 36 
N.M. 41, 44-45, 7 P.2d 933, 935 (1932)). 
115 CoMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 58. 
116 Id. at 61. 
117 As in People v. Borchers, 50 Cal. 2d 321, 325 P.2d 97 {1958), where the wife told her 
husband, the defendant, that she had been unfaithful, asked him to kill her and her four-year-
old child, and taunted him by calling him a "chicken." 
118 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 59. 
119 88 Wash. 304, 153 P. 9 (1915). 
120 CoMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 59. 
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intentional killing from murder to manslaughter. 121 
The problem with the rule is that the law should not necessarily 
distinguish between the person who instantly reacts to the provocation 
and the person who broods for a week or two and then responds. The 
Code recognizes this, and does not set out a specific rule with respect to 
the suddenness of the situation. The validity of the Code's position is 
seen in cases such as People v. Berry. 122 The victim in that case, defend-
ant's wife, was a suicidally inclined young woman who pursued her 
death wish by "sexually arousing him and taunting him into jealous 
rages in an unconscious desire to provoke him into killing her and thus 
consummating her desire for suicide."123 For a two week period she con-
tinually harassed defendant with sexual taunts and incitements, and re-
peated references to her involvement with another man. Finally, the 
defendant strangled her to death. Under the "sudden passion" rule the 
defendant would not have been able to prove his defense. 124 The court, 
however, recognized that the 
two-week period of provocatory conduct by his wife . . . could arouse a 
passion of jealousy, pain and sexual rage in an ordinary man of average 
disposition such as to cause him to act rashly from this passion. . . . 
The Attorney General contends that the killing could not have been 
done in the heat of passion because there was a cooling period . . . . 
However, the long course of provocatory conduct, which had resulted in 
intermittent outbreaks of rage under specific provocation in the past, 
reached its final culmination . . . . 125 
The Model Penal Code treatment of manslaughter is a "modified 
121 88 Wash. at 314, 153 P. at 14. See also People v. Wilson, 3 Ill. App. 3d 481, 486, 278 
N.E.2d 473, 477 (1972) ("To reduce an unlawful killing from murder to voluntary man-
slaughter, the sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation cannot be fol~ 
lowed by a period of time sufficient for the passion to cool and the voice of reason to be 
heard.''). 
122 18 Cal. 2d 504, 556 P.2d 777, 134 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1976). 
123 Id. at 514, 556 P.2d at 780, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 418. 
124 The Model Penal Code requires the government to prove the elements of the voluntary 
mamlaughter offense, though some states required the accused to prove the provocation 
claim by a preponderance of the evidence. As the commentators point out, there has been 
some question as to the constitutionality of placing this burden on the defendant. In Mulla-
ney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) the Supreme Court struck down a state statute which 
required the defendant to prove provocation by preponderance of the evidence. But see Pat-
terson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) where the Court upheld the constitutionality of 
requiring the defendant to shoulder the burden under a state statute which referred to emo-
tional distrubance. The Court found that the emotional disturbance element, unlike the 
provocation aspect in Mullaney, raised an affirmative defense. "The Model Code takes ... 
the ... position advanced as a constitutional rule by Mr. Justice Powell's dissent in Patterson, 
that, once the defendant has come forward with some evidence of extreme emotional distur-
bance, the burden of proving its non-existence should shift to the prosecution.'' COMMENTA-
RIES, supra note 1, at 63-64 n.58. &e also supra note 93. 
125 18 Cal. 3d at 515-16, 556 P.2d at 780-81, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 419. 
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and substantially enlarged version of the rule of provocation."126 This 
expansion is thoroughly justified, however, for it realistically allows the 
important questions regarding mitigation of the crime to be placed 
before the jury without any strict categories as to time or type of behav-
ior required. It allows the jury to apply a standard which is both subjec-
tive and objective. In short, it is a substantial improvement over the 
uncertainties of the common law. 127 
I turn now to another situation. Suppose the defendant shoots and 
kills the victim, believing that the victim was about to shoot and kill 
him. The defendant's belief, though genuinely held, is unreasonable. 
Had this mistaken belief been reasonable, the defendant would be able 
to raise a complete, or "perfect," claim of self-defense. Under the tradi-
tional provocation rule, the hypothetical defendant would be convicted 
of murder because he had the intent to kill and could not claim to have 
been aroused by the "heat of passion." Recognizing this "as an indefen-
sible position"128 the Code has adopted a version of the "imperfect" 
right of self-defense. The standard version, as enacted in Illinois, focuses 
attention on the defendant's sincere, but unreasonable belief: "A person 
who intentionally or knowingly kills an individual commits voluntary 
manslaughter if at the time of the killing he believes the circumstances 
to be such that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the killing 
... , but his belief is unreasonable." 129 The Code treatment of the im-
126 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 60. 
127 The Commentaries also discuss the diminished responsibility concept. The commenta-
tors clearly support the notion that "all evidence logically relevant to establishing the actor's 
state of mind" should be admissible. COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 66. This, of course, 
reiterates the point that the individual characteristics of the defendant ought to be considered 
to some extent in determining provocation and the reaction of the defendant. With r~pect to 
the question of allowing diminished responsibility to reduce murder to manslaughter, how-
ever, the commentators are far less certain: 
Recognizing diminished responsibility as an alternative ground for reducing murder to 
manslaughter undermines this scheme. Unlike provocation, diminished responsibility is 
entirely subjective in character. It looks into the actor's mind to see whether he should 
be judged by a lesser standard than that applicable to ordinary men. It recognizes the 
defendant's own mental disorder or emotional instability as a basis for partially excusing 
his conduct. This position undoubtedly achieves a closer relation between criminal lia-
bility and moral guilt. 
/d. at 71. The commentators conclude that the Code does not recognize diminished responsi-
bility as a distinct category of mitigation, but "leaves the issue, together with many others, as 
part of the generic problem of determining the extent to which the actor's individual charac-
teristics should be taken into account in the formula." /d. at 73. 
128 /d. 
129 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-2(b) {1979). &e also People v. Joyner, 50 Ill. 2d 302, 309, 
278 N.E.2d 756, 759 {1972): 
Occasionally a defendant who raises a defense of self-defense to a charge of murder is 
convicted of manslaughter . . . . The difference between a justified killing under self-
defense and the one not justified, amounting to voluntary manslaughter, is that in the 
former instance the belief that the use of force is necessary is reasonable under the cir-
cumstances, and in the latter, the belief is unreasonable. 
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perfect defense is preferable to this version simply because it is more 
precise. It allows for a manslaughter conviction in the situation dis-
cussed above, but specifies that the defendant could be guilty of crimi-
nal homicide if his belief was formed recklessly or negligently. 130 
The final area in the law of manslaughter in which the Code has 
made an important contribution is the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule, 
an offshoot of the felony murder rule. As with felony murder, the broad 
scope of the rule provided that it was a homicide offense if the defendant 
caused a death while committing, or attempting to commit, a crime. 
Although a number of courts have narrowly construed the rule131 it is, 
nevertheless, "objectionable on the same ground as the felony-murder 
rule. It dispenses with proof of culpability and imposes liability for a 
serious crime without reference to the actor's state of mind." 132 To be 
sure, it is even worse than the felony murder rule, for the defendant may 
be charged with a homicide offense even though he may not have com-
mitted any serious offense and might not be chargeable with generally 
reckless conduct. 133 
People v. Nelson 134 is perhaps the most extreme application of the 
misdemeanor-manslaughter rule. The defendant was an elderly man, 
formerly a tenant, who eventually became the owner of his building. 
Two persons were killed in a fire which occurred in the building. The 
government showed that a violation of the building law, a misde-
meanor, caused the deaths. The defendant contended that he did not 
know of the building law and thus had not acted in a reckless fashion. 
The trial judge would not let the jury consider the issue of the defend-
ant's knowledge, and the Court of Appeals of New York affirmed. 135 
The dissenter disagreed: 
130 It is difficult to imagine many situations in which the defendant would be able to state 
a legitimate self-defense argument when he was reckless as to the mistaken belief in the neces-
sity. If recklessness requires a conscious disregard of a substantial risk with respect to the 
necessity of defense, the prosecution may properly argue that he truly did not believe he was 
entitled to use force and hence ought to be guilty of murder. 
131 For example, some states apply the rule only to misdemeanors mala i'n se but not to 
misdemeanors mala prohz"bi'ta. Others refuse to apply the rule where the underlying crime is 
one of strict liability. But see ziifi-a text accompanying notes 134-38. The commentators dis-
cuss these limitations in some detail. COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 76-77. 
132 Id. at 77. 
133 In a situation involving a serious crime such as rape or armed robbery, it would not be 
difficult for the finder of fact to conclude that the defendant had consciously disregarded a 
very serious risk, proven by his involvement in such a violent crime. The death of the victim 
could more justifiably be considered criminal homicide. 
134 309 N.Y. 231, 128 N.E.2d 391 (1955). 
135 The court stated: 
It is undeniable that a tremendous duty is placed upon the owners and those in charge of 
property under the applicable section of the Multiple Dwelling Law; however, it is quite 
apparent that the Legislature intended the burden to be onerous so that owners would 
be impressed with the consequences flowing from violation of the statute, which viola-
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If awareness of the misdemeanor is held to be irrelevant, the basis for 
guilt of manslaughter is eliminated. . . . 
" ... When there is a general intent to do evil, in other words, of 
which evil the wrong actually done may be looked upon as a probable 
incident, then the party having such general intent is to be regarded as 
having intended the particular wrong."136 
Nelson demonstrates how indefensible the misdemeanor-manslaugh-
ter rule is. Even though the defendant may have committed the sub-
stantive crime, it is wrong to hold him for a homicide offense without a 
showing of a culpable state of mind. Unlike the presumption adopted in 
the felony-murder area, 137 the approach of the Code draftsmen here is 
straightforward. They expressly abolish the misdemeanor-manslaughter 
rule. This approach is quite proper. If the defendant acted in an other-
wise reckless or negligent fashion, he may be charged with homicide. If 
he has not acted culpably, even though guilty of a misdemeanor, he 
should not be brought within the reach of a manslaughter statute. 138 
CONCLUSION 
The approach of the Model Penal Code in the area of criminal 
homicide is illustrative of the general approach of the Code. There are 
several difficult subjects which the draftsmen have chosen to deal with 
in a direct and clear fashion; others have been avoided or obfuscated. 
For example, the draftsmen were careful to define with clarity the ele-
ments of the crime of manslaughter, avoiding the common law difficul-
ties. They explicitly rejected those murder statutes which had divided 
the offense into degrees. On the other hand, they have failed to come to 
tenns with important definitions such as "death," they have refused to 
confront the possibility of a feticide statute, and have only partiaJly re-
sponded to the intense criticism of the felony murder. 
The great worth of the Code cannot, however, be evaluated by 
looking to such specifics. The Code has had tremendous influence on 
the criminal law in this country and has brought consi,derable clarity 
tions could so readily endanger human life in the congested conditions under which peo-
ple must live in the City of New York. 
/d. at 236, 128 N.E.2d at 394. 
136 /d. at 239, 128 N.E.2d at 395 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 WHARTON's 
CRIMINAL LAw § 157 (12th ed. 1932)). 
137 &e supra text accompanying notes 73-97. 
138 Related to the misdemeanor manslaughter rule is the so-called intent to injure rule. As 
stated by the commentators, many jurisdictions have provisions in which "one who caused 
the death of another by a simple battery was generally guilty of manslaughter or of involun-
tary manslaughter where that was a separate category, however improbable the fatal result." 
CoMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 78. The imposition of homicide sanctions makes little sense 
absent some reckless or negligent conduct apart from the battery itself. The Code rejects the 
intent to injure rule and simply focuses on whether the defendant's action is reckless or negli-
gent in determining which, if any, homicide category should be applied. 
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and uniformity to an area of the law in which both were notoriously 
absent. The efforts of Professors Low and Jeffries _will serve further to 
clarify and explain the rationale for the Code, allowing lawyers, judges 
and legislators to understand the positions taken by the draftsmen and 
intelligently to decide whether such positions are supportable. The 
commentators' efforts are both substantial and significant. By updating 
the explanations for the Code provisions they have provided an invalua-
ble aid to those engaged in the administration of criminal justice. 
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PRISONS AND POLITICS. By Richard A. McGee. Lexington, Mass.: Lex-
ington Books, 1981. Pp. xiv, 162. $21.95. 
Those in the business of crisis prediction should have little difficulty 
recognizing one that's as sure a bet as any for the 1980s-the crisis of 
America's burgeoning prisons. The criminal justice system responded to 
the crime explosion of the 1960s and '70s, a period in which the homi-
cide rate doubled, with an unprecedented expansion in our prison and 
jail populations-from 356,000 in 1970 to 530,000 by 1977. With most 
indicators pointing to a continuation of the upward trend in inmate 
populations, only the most optimistic and least informed could not be 
concerned about the potential for upheaval in our nation's prisons by 
1990. 
Under such circumstances, we would be foolish not to do our best 
to understand the lessons of previous episodes of turmoil in our prisons, 
as well as a few episodes of success that have occurred here and there, so 
as to avoid repeating past errors and make use of what has worked. In 
sharing his treasure of personal experience as a prison administrator in 
the states of New York, Washington, and California, Richard McGee, in 
Prisons and Politics, provides the means to enable others to understand 
such lessons. McGee's account of the problems of prison administration 
and how he has dealt with them is both thoughtful and thorough. His 
grasp of the fundamental issues is deep: 
Public officials . . . know instinctively that their prisons are unflatter-
ing reflections of their cultures. All societies have difficulty reconciling 
their desire to be humane and compassionate with their exasperation with 
overt antisocial behavior. To hurt and heal, to banish and forgive, to de-
stroy and rebuild: these difficult and contradictory concepts come face to 
face in their starkest form in prison. (p. 84.) 
McGee's credentials in prison administration are second to none. 
